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Lowe,E.J.(2000)’Causalclosureprinciplesandemergentism.’,Philosophy.,75(4).pp.571-585.

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Causal Closure Principles and

Emergentism

E . J. L O WE

At one time, it was popular to argue against interactionist dualism

by appeal to the conservation laws of physics, such as the laws of the

conservation of energy and momentum. However, those laws are

not sacrosanct and there need be nothing unscientific about ques-

tioning them—indeed they have been questioned from time to time

by cosmologists and other physicists. Think, for instance, of Bondi

and Gold’s steady-state model of the universe, which postulated the

continuous creation of matter and hence of energy. 1 In an y case,

appeal to those laws can at best only be used to attack dualist mod-

els of psychophysical causation which attribute to the non-physical

mind an ability to affect the energy or momentum of a physical sys-

tem. I say ‘at best’ because some interactionist dualists, such as W.

D. Hart, have postulated the existence of ‘psychic energy’, which is

convertible into physical energy in accordance with the conservation

laws. 2 It w on’t do simply to object that energy is by definition a

physical quantity, as this threatens to turn the dispute into a purely

verbal one. In view of these and other limitations, it would serve

physicalists well if they could frame a more general argument

against interactionist dualism, which did not make specific appeal to

the conservation laws. 3 Man y modern physicalists think that they

have an argument of just this sort to hand, in the form of the causal

closure argument . 4

In fact, this is not so much a single argument as a family of argu-

ments. A ‘causal closure argument’, as I shall be interpreting that

1 See H. Bondi, Cosmology , 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press,

1961), Ch. XII.

2 See W. D. Hart, The Engines of the Soul (Cambridge University Press,

1988), Ch. 9.

3 F or further discussion of the (ir)relevance of physical conservation

laws to the problem of psychophysical causation, see my Subjects of

Experience (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 56–63.

4 A r elatively early version of this form of argument may be found in

Christopher Peacocke, Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 134–43, though Peacocke’s version

does not exactly conform to the pattern I specify below. I raise an objec-

tion to Peacocke’s argument in my ‘Against an Argument for Token

Identity’, Mind 90 (1981), pp. 120–1.

Philosophy 75 2000

571

E. J. Lowe

phrase, has three premises: first, a physical causal closure principle;

second, the claim—to which interactionist dualists are themselves

committed—that at least some mental events are causes of physical

events; and third, the claim that the physical effects of mental caus-

es are not, in general, causally overdetermined. 5 T he conclusion of

such an argument is that at least some mental events are identical

with physical events. Incidentally, I am assuming for the time being

that the relata of causal relations are events, broadly conceived to

include both processes and states, but not too much turns on this

assumption at the moment. Later on, however, I shall introduce a

distinction between event-causation and fact-causation which may

have a significant bearing on the issues under discussion. 6

As we shall see shortly, physicalists espousing causal closure argu-

ments do not always agree on the way to formulate their causal clo-

sure principles. What is crucial to the success of such an argument

is that the causal closure principle appealed to should be neither too

strong nor too weak. If the principle is so strong, for instance, as to

render redundant the third premise of the argument—the non-

overdetermination claim—then the argument will become simply

question-begging, because it will amount to an argument from two

premises, one of which is accepted by the dualist, to a conclusion

which is not accepted by the dualist: and in these circumstances the

dualist may justly urge that his opponent is, in effect, merely assert-

ing what he is denying. Moreover, to have any persuasive force, the

causal closure principle must be one for which some measure of

empirical support can plausibly be mustered, and this places limits

on how strong it can be. On the other hand, the causal closure prin-

ciple must, obviously, not be so weak that the argument in which it

is deployed turns out to be invalid. What I shall try to show in this

paper is that it is in fact very difficult, if not impossible, for the

physicalist to formulate a causal closure principle which is neither

too strong nor too weak by these standards. In particular, I shall

argue that there are various forms of naturalistic dualism, of an

emergentist character, which are perfectly consistent with the

5 W hy should systematic causal overdetermination be ruled out where

psychophysical causation is concerned? Perhaps it shouldn’t be, and this

would be a quick way to dispose of causal closure arguments: see further

Eugene Mills, ‘Interactionism and Ove rd e t e r m i n a t i o n’, A m e r i c a n

Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996), pp. 105–17. But I take it that most inter-

actionist dualists would not wish to resort to this strategy if possible, as it

looks suspiciously ad hoc .

6 For more on the distinction between event-causation and fact-causa-

tion, see Jonathan Bennett, Events and their Names (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1988), pp. 21ff.

572

Causal Closure Principles and Emer

gentism

strongest physical causal closure principles that can plausibly be

advocated. If that is correct, then it means that causal closure argu-

ments against interactionist dualism do not, after all, provide a

superior alternative to the discredited arguments which appeal to

the conservation laws of physics.

I mentioned a moment ago the variety of causal closure principles

appealed to by physicalists. Let me briefly illustrate this variety by

some examples. In a recent paper, David Papineau appeals to the

following principle, which he calls the principle of ‘the complete-

ness of physics’: 7

(1A) All physical effects have sufficient physical causes.

But in an earlier book, he appeals instead to a somewhat different

principle, which he calls by the same title, namely: 8

(1B) All physical effects have complete physical causes.

Papineau explains that by ‘complete’ here he means ‘“complete” in

the sense that those causes on their own suffice by physical law to

fix the chances of those effects’. However, he does also advert to the

latter formulation in a footnote to the more recent paper, remarking

that ‘a stricter version ... would say that the chances of physical

effects are always fixed by sufficient physical causes’. 9

In another recent contribution to the literature on causal closure,

Scott Sturgeon states what he too calls the principle of the com-

pleteness of physics as follows: 10

(1C) Every physical effect has a fully revealing, purely physical

history.

However, Sturgeon himself glosses this in terms reminiscent of

Papineau’s, as meaning that ‘physical effects have their chances fully

determined by physical events alone’. In a paper commenting on

Sturgeon’s, Paul Noordhof seizes upon this gloss, remarking that it

‘seems more perspicuous’ than Sturgeon’s official formulation. 11

7 David Papineau, ‘Mind the Gap’, in J ames E. Tomberlin (ed.),

Philosophical Perspectives , 12: Language, Mind and Ontology (Oxford:

Blackwell, 1998), pp. 373–88: see p. 375.

8 David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993),

p. 22.

9 Papineau, ‘Mind the Gap’, p. 386, n. 4.

10 Scott Stur geon, ‘Physicalism and Overdetermination’, Mind 107

(1998), pp. 411–32: see p. 413.

1 1 Paul Noord h o f, ‘The Ove rdetermination Argument ve rsus the

Cause-and-Essence Principle—No Contest’, M i n d 108 (1999), pp.

367–75: see p. 367.

573

E. J. Lowe

Accordingly, Noordhof advances the following as his own preferred

version of the causal closure principle:

(1D) Every physical effect has its chance fully determined by

physical events alone.

It is worth mentioning, however, that in a further gloss on his ver-

sion of the principle, Sturgeon asserts that ‘physics does not admit

that physical effects have non-physical causes’, 12 and this suggests

yet another formulation, namely:

(1E) No physical effect has a non-physical cause.

Pretty clearly, principles (1A) to (1E) are not all equivalent to one

another, whatever one makes of the various glosses supplied by their

advocates. And these by no means exhaust the variety of formula-

tions to be found in the literature. One might have hoped for more

exactitude and agreement amongst physicalists when it comes to the

formulation of a principle so central to their position.

One thing we should notice immediately is that the last version

just cited, (1E), is too strong by the standards laid down earlier,

because it is bound to render redundant the non-overdetermination

premise of any causal closure argument in which it is deployed. To

see this clearly, let me now state explicitly what the remaining

premises and the conclusion of such an argument are supposed to

be. Obviously, these premises and the conclusion are themselves

susceptible to some variation in their formulation, but I shall utilize

what I hope can be agreed to be uncontentious versions of them.

The second premise, maintaining the existence of psychophysical

causation, may be stated thus:

(2) At least some mental events are causes of physical events.

The third premise, excluding the possibility of systematic causal

overdetermination, may be expressed as follows:

(3) The physical effects of

mental causes are not, in general,

c a u s a l l y overdetermined.

And the anti-dualist conclusion of the argument is supposed to be

this:

(4) At least some mental events are identical with physical events.

However, it is quite evident that (1E) and (2) together entail (4),

without the help of (3), so that (1E) can fairly be dismissed by the

interactionist dualist as question-begging—as I am sure it would be.

12 Stur geon, ‘Physicalism and Overdetermination’, p. 413.

574

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