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Critical complexities
(From marginal paradigms to
learning networks)
Slawomir Magala
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
JOCM
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312
Keywords Paradigms, Research, Networking, Organizational learning
Abstract The concepts of critical theory and complexity merit criticism. Growth of knowledge
merits paradigmatic sacrifices. The erosion of orthodox establishments and an on-going re-
structuring of research communities make the sciences of management susceptible to the
influences of critical social scientists. A change of paradigms ceased to be a threatening
emergency so vividly evoked by Kuhn. The new complex world of overlapping research networks is
less hierarchic, more mobile, and not easily centralized. In boundary-less correlations all critical
research paradigms are subjected to a networking and re-networking at all times. Postmodernist
anarchism (``anything goes'') is presently giving rise to the theories of organisational learning.
The latter express a methodological compromise with respect to the paradigms and a political
compromise with respect to the governance structures. The underlying tensions motivate an
ongoing search for a sustainable compromise between a critical thrust of research and a
managerial need for governance, accountability and control.
The only people who see the whole picture are the ones who step out of the frame (Salman
Rushdie).
Relevance of a ``critical theory''
Criticism and the growth of knowledge are firmly connected in the
methodological mind. No theory can be accepted if it has not been subjected to a
fair criticism. One does not have to be a falsificationist to adhere to this view. A
critical theory is always relevant since it allows for less trivial insights into the
underlying mechanisms of social processes than a mainstream one. However,
the limits of legitimate criticism are being continuously renegotiated within the
research communities. Groomed in the philosophy of science overshadowed by
Popper and Kuhn in the 1960s and 1970s, most social scientists and scholars
tend to think that the mainstream ``normal science'' is still run mainly by the
modified neopositivists. They are the principal gate-keepers guarding the gates
of scientific journals, research grants, academic promotions and other Bastilles
of the Kingdom of Rational Knowledge flying the flags of Enlightenment. When
Lakatos and Musgrave edited one of the first volumes of papers on the
philosophy of science after the publication of The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn, they gave it a title ``Criticism and the growth of
knowledge''. Lakatos believed that scepticism should be kept in check, and
never allowed to subvert scientific rationality with the extreme relativism. In an
unpublished comment on Paul Feyerabend's ``dadaist'' treatise Against Method,
he warned against radical sceptics (including, for instance, his above-mentioned
friend and a fellow-Popperian), claiming that:
Journal of Organizational Change
Management,
Vol. 13 No. 4, 2000, pp. 312-333.
# MCB University Press, 0953-4814
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Critical
complexities
for them, happiness and welfare replaced truth: truth was what increased happiness. They
argued that the betrayal of reason (or rather ``reason'') by man was better than betrayal
of man by reason . . . Ultimately, there is only one type of political philosophy consistent
with radical scepticism: the philosophy which equates right with might (Lakatos, 1999,
p. 396)[1].
Therefore, a modified Popperian philosophy of science (which itself was a
response to the crisis of the neopositivist methodology) must counter the
excessive scepticism and criticism of a ``normal science''. In spite of the
influence exerted by the Popperians in the philosophy of science, Lakatos did
not think that modified neopositivist methodological doctrines were still
dominant, while the Popperian one was limited to the professional philosophers
of science. Moreover, those who have tried to apply the neopositivist research
program in social sciences, as did, for instance, the father of sociobiology,
Edward O. Wilson, encountered the opposition, which made them remark
bitterly that: ``postmodernism . . . has seeped by now into the mainstream of the
social sciences and humanities'' (Wilson, 1999, p. 44)[2].
One of the ways to test the conflicting claims about the ``mainstream'',
``establishment'', ``dominant'' scientific research programs is to study the role of
historically acknowledged ``outsider'' research programs and their influence
upon the subsequent generations of researchers. The critical theory of the
Frankfurt School is a case in point. It grew out of a marginal initiative of the
leftist thinkers prevented from following a regular academic career. The
Marxist theoretical inspiration coupled with the methodology of empirical
studies of the working class movements and daily life (sociology of the family)
gained a new twist after a forced immigration of the school's representatives to
the USA. The most significant contributions of the Frankfurt School to the
criticism of modern society and modern social sciences include their empirical
studies of the authoritarian personality (the ethnocentric syndrome) and
their philosophical critique of mass culture (cultural industries). The
questionnaires developed in the USA allowed them to study the willingness of
individual citizens to follow non-democratic leaders and to espouse
ethnocentric views (a critique of which provided a starting point for a
democratic citizens' education). Their critique of the cultural industries
legitimised by the Enlightenment allowed them to demonstrate the necessity of
an ongoing revision of ideologies, programs and paradigms (which provided a
starting point for a re-definition of scientific rationality and its sociopolitical
boundaries).
Can modern sciences of management find any inspiration in the critical
tradition of the Frankfurt School? Can contemporary philosophers, sociologists,
social psychologists, historians, economists and theoreticians of organisation
pick up relevant themes and discoveries? In 1988 an international congress
entitled ``The Frankfurt School: How Relevant Is It Today?'' has been organised
by two members of the faculty of the Rotterdam School of Management of the
Erasmus University in Rotterdam[3]. An interdisciplinary approach practised
by the representatives of the faculty of business management attracted many
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researchers with different academic backgrounds. They tried to look for the
relevance of the ``leftist'' research community from the 1930s for the critical
researchers of the 1990s. Critical researchers of the 1990s do not have a
recognizably ``leftist'' political stand. There is no scientific research program
which can be compared to a particularly critical, identifiable platform ±
resembling the political ``left'' within the academic community, or even carrying
leftist philosophy from politics to science (which was still the case with the
Marxism of the Frankfurt School).
Critical research communities cannot be easily labelled as either ``leftist'' or
``rightist'' today. They are servicing both revolutionaries and consultants, both
managers and students, both paid public officials and free virtual networks,
both identifiable clients and potential audiences. Historians ± Rolf
Wiggershaus and Martin Jay[4] agreed that there was a recognisable link
between the first generation of the Frankfurt scholars ± Adorno, Horkheimer ±
and their disciple, Habermas, who has also established a critical research
program built around a theory of communicative action (recognised and used
by the US sociologists ± Thomas McCarthy, Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen)[5].
One should also add, on a generational note, that Habermas, as opposed to
Adorno, fared much better with the rebellious students of 1968 and maintained
long-term contacts with the red-green politicians who emerged from this
generation (for instance, with Joshka Fischer and Daniel Cohn-Bendit).
The congress on the relevance of the critical theory for the sciences of
management found place 12 years ago: these 12 years have witnessed an
emergence of a number of theories of flexible, learning, innovative, flat, agile
and knowledge creating organisational form (see Nooteboom, 2000)[6]. Are any
of the views expressed by the participants in the congress relevant for the
present-day concerns of researchers in the sciences of management?
Mats Alvesson and Hugh Willmott claim that the tradition of the critical
theory includes at least two constitutive elements; a rational reconstruction
(which should reveal the ``distortions'' caused by powers that be in the social
construction of organisation, management, research, in brief ± in the ongoing
social construction of reality) and what they call a critical self-reflection. They
define the latter quoting Habermas, according to whom a critical self-reflection
``involves a practical translation of the insights of reconstruction into some
form of emancipatory action''. Both are relevant for contemporary studies in
organisation theory ± for Wood, Urry, Knights, Giddens, Burrell, Morgan,
Smirchich, and, needless to say, for Alvesson and Willmott. The latter notice
the relevance of the critical theory for modern sciences of management in four
broad areas:
(1)
314
potential development of a methodological research program (although
no representative of the critical theory actually ventured so far as to
elaborate a complete methodological framework, a number of recent
critical studies ± e.g. by Guba, Lincoln, Erlandson, Clegg, Aldrich, or
Gergen clearly demonstrate this possibility);
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(2) a critique of prevailing ideology (critical analysis of the one-
dimensionality of the managerial ideologies, especially in operations
research, e.g. Jackson, Sievers, Boje, Burrell, Harvey);
(3) empirical studies of organising (especially focussing on the asymmetries
of power in companies ± Alvesson, Czarniawska, Ingersoll, Adams), and
(last not least);
(4) methodologies of change, with a focus either on a local planning practice
(see Forester, 1989) or on a broader concern for developing a ``conceptual
framework that could transform critical theory from a mere research
program into a practical tool of critical social inquiry and design''
(Alvesson and Willmott, 1990, p. 49, see also Marion, Esterby-Smith,
Flood, Morgan, or Rickards for recent critical methodologies of change).
Due to the impact in these four areas, the critical theory of the Frankfurt School
is still relevant for contemporary social sciences in general and for the sciences
of management in particular. The latter, if pursued by those research
communities, which had been influenced by the tradition of the critical theory,
stand to win in critical insights and intellectual respectability. Alvesson and
Willmott quote J.K. Benson, who claims that the critical theory's contribution to
the shaping of actual practice of organising consists of: ``dereifying established
social patterns and structures ± it points out their arbitrary character,
undermines their sense of inevitability, uncovers the contradictions and limits
of the present order, and reveals the mechanisms of transformation'' (Alvesson
and Willmott, 1990, p. 59).
Other contributors to the above-mentioned volume of proceedings of the
1988 congress on relevance of the critical theory for the sciences of
management shared this view. They included, to mention just a few, J. Forester
of Cornell University, B. Czarniawska-Joerges of Stockholm School of
Economics, Jean Cohen of Columbia University, Lolle Nauta of the University
of Groningen, Dick Howard of SUNY at Stony Brook and Brian Turner of
Exeter University. Some of the above-mentioned researchers changed their
academic environment and affiliation, but most of them maintained their level
of participation in highly interactive networks of virtual research communities.
It should come as no surprise that most of them reconvene ± virtually or
physically ± every year at the annual SCOS (Standing Conference on
Organisational Symbolism) conference[7]. The processes of organising of the
annual SCOS conference stand in a marked contrast to the processes of
organising the equivalent EGOS conference; they are much more informal and
based almost entirely on flexible, individually maintained virtual networks.
Critical
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315
Virtual networks and the relativist view from nowhere
Postmodernists have often been suspected of occupying an epistemologically
comfortable (but ethically suspect) relativist, or extremely sceptical position.
They were found guilty of rejecting any privileged language game, any
privileged grand narrative, and any model dominant enough to ``orientate''
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research. According to Martin Parker, who considers ways of
``postmodernizing'' the sciences of management, there are advantages to this
relativist position. They have been noticed by Terry Eagleton, whom Parker
quotes as saying that: ``It allows you to drive a coach and horses through
anybody else's beliefs while not saddling you with the inconvenience of having
to adopt any yourself. Such deconstruction is a power game . . . the winner is
the one who manages to get rid of all his cards and sit with empty hands''
(Parker, 2000, p. 45)[8]. If we agreed, we would have to assume that
postmodernists are basically opportunists, whose lack of principles makes it
easier for them to adapt themselves to the shifting constellations of power both
in the academic communities and beyond. However, there are problems with a
mechanical comparison of the standards of commitment to a ``progressive''
social and political change maintained by the representatives of the critical
theory of the Frankfurt School on the one hand, and the standards of
commitment to a ``progressive'' organisational change by the postmodernist
researchers (nowadays) on the other. To put it bluntly: for the Frankfurt
researchers definitions of political left and political right were as clear as
differences between a communist and a nazi party. For the present researchers
a support for some political position on the ecological or gender issues does not
automatically allow to select either a left or a right political party, or any
political party (which may be considered irrelevant in the solving of an issue at
hand) at all.
There is also a methodological and ethical problem of distinguishing
between an empirically and theoretically progressive problem shift (which is,
according to Lakatos, symptomatic for a progressive methodological research
program) and a theoretically and empirically degenerative one. The problem is
both historical and methodological. Historically speaking, a critical research
program which inspired both the researchers from the Frankfurt School and
moulded a significant generational experience of the postmodernist researchers
(most of whom took part in the student rebellions in the years 1966-1975), the
Marxist one, has become an official state ideology in the socialist states.
Practical activities of the power Âlites of the communist parties (1945-1989)
provided a historical falsification of the emancipatory claims of the Marxist
ideology[9]. Scientific research program used as an ideological legitimation for
a ruling party degenerated rapidly. State policies ostensibly based on and
certainly justified with Marxian theory did not contribute to the construction of
superior and sustainable societies. Marxian paradigm did not make all the
other paradigms in social sciences obsolete, theories produced by the Marxists
failed to overshadow all the other theories. This means, to put it in a nutshell,
that critical and politically committed researchers rejected the idea that their
struggle should end with the overthrowing of the ``dominant paradigm'' and
with replacing it with their own, more progressive one (which would have to be
defended in order to maintain the dominant position, thus placing them in the
position, which would merit the same critique they had launched against their
paradigmatic enemies). They have introduced the idea of a ``self-limiting
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