Questioning Technology 2.pdf

Inquiry ,43,445–50

TheOnticandtheOntologicalin

Heidegger’sPhilosophyofTechnology:

ResponsetoThomson

AndrewFeenberg

SanDiegoStateUniversity

IainThomson’scritiqueispersuasiveonseveralpointsbutnotonthemajorissue,the

relationoftheontologicaltotheonticinHeidegger’sphilosophyoftechnology.This

replyattemptstoshowthatthesetwodimensionsofHeidegger’stheoryareclosely

related,atleastinthetechnologicaldomain,andnotseparate,asThomsonaf Ž rms.It

isarguedthatHeidegger’sevaluationsofparticulartechnologies,the � awsofwhich

Thomsonconcedes,proceedfroma � awedontologicalconception.

LetmebeginbythankingIainThomsonforclarifyinganumberofpointsin

theinterpretationofHeidegger’sphilosophyoftechnology.Iwillcertainly

havetobemorecautiousincriticizinghisthoughtinthefuture,butIstillhave

somefairlybasicdisagreements.

Iconcedethattheadjective‘unhistorical’doesnotquiteapplyto

Heidegger’stheory.WhatIcalled‘unhistorical’abouthisaccountofmodern

technologyisnotthatitlacksanorigin,butthatitlacksanend.Tobesure,

Heidegger’shistoryofbeinggrantstheuniquenessofmodernity,andIwould

agreethatthereis something uniqueaboutit.ButIcan Ž ndnoindicationin

histhoughtthatthe things wenormallyrefertoas‘moderntechnology’can

changesigni Ž cantlyinthefuture.Evenifthe‘modeofrevealing’wereto

shiftawayfromthetechnologicalenframing,itseemsasthoughwewould

stillbeusingthesamedevices.HydroelectricplantsontheRhinewouldstill

‘challenge’naturetodeliveroveritsenergyforaprojectofdomination,even

ifwenolongerparticipatedinthatproject.Thisratherconfusingprospectis

duetothepartialdisconnectionofHeidegger’sconceptoftheessenceof

technologyfromactualdevices,towhichIwillreturnbelow.

IwouldalsoagreewithThomsonthattherewasatimeinhislifewhen

Heideggerwasnotfatalistic,whenheheldoutthehopeofradicalchange.

Unfortunately,thishopewaslinkedwithNazism,thefailureofwhich

Heideggerhimselfeventuallyrecognized.Hislaterthoughtproposesnot

technologicalactivismbut Gelassenheit ,translatedas‘releasement’,

althoughtheusualmeaningis‘calmness’or‘composure’.Wearetouse

technologyindifferently,withoutourselvesbeingmobilizedbythe

technologicalenframing.I Ž ndnotraceoftheearlyactivismhereatall.

Perhapsthereisdeepinsightintotheconditionsforanothertypeofmodernity

thatwouldhelpusachievetheHegeliantranscendenceoftechnologyfor

whichHeidegger Ž nallycalled,buthedidnotapplyhisthoughttoactual

# 2000Taylor&Francis

446 AndrewFeenberg

devices,justtoourattitudetowardthemandtowardnature.Andevenin

discussingapossiblesuccessortothetechnologicalrevealinghisdiscourseis

sovagueandoracularitisnotpossibleto Ž gureoutwhathehopesorexpects.

IwouldagreewithThomsonthathispositionisnotirrelevant,butitdoesnot

gofarenough.

Weliveinasocietyinturmoilaroundtechnicalissuesincommunications,

computers,medicine,theenvironment.Howarewetointerveneandfor

what?Ihavearguedformorehistoricalcontinuityinourjudgementsof

moderntechnologyandanappreciationoftheroleofthetechnicallife-world

inwhichwelivewithdevices,notmerelycontrollingthembutalso Ž nding

meaningthroughthem.Thisapproachopensthepossibilitythatdesirable

featuresofpre-moderntechnicallifeormarginaltechnicalpracticestoday

maytakeongreaterimportanceinthetechnicalfuture.Oneexample:

collegialcontrolofproductionbytheproducers,afeatureofcraft,mightbe

restoredinare-skilledversionofindustrialism.

IdoagreethatthisconclusionresemblesDreyfus’sinterpretationofthe

roleofmarginalpracticesinHeidegger.Itooamadvocatingareversalin

valuesthatwouldprivilegesourcesofmeaningpresentinourexperiencebut

pushedtothesidebythefrenziedstruggleformoneyandpowerthat

characterizestheage.However,Icannotagreethatthisaccuratelyre � ects

Heidegger’sownview.ItseemstomethatHeideggerwashimselffarmore

deeplytouchedbymodernnihilismthanThomsoniswillingtoconcede,far

moresothanDreyfus.Nothinginhisworldescapedtheenframing

suf Ž cientlytoconstituteanew‘god’.ThisiswhyafterhisNazi � inghe

neverspeci Ž edthecontentofhisnebuloushopes,certainlynotintermsofa

concretehistoricalalternativesuchasWoodstock.

Buttheinterestingandperhapsinconclusivediscussionofthesepoints

doesnottakeustothecoreofourdisagreement,therelationbetweentheontic

andtheontologicalintheunderstandingoftechnology.Thomsonemphasizes

thatHeidegger’sessenceoftechnology,‘enframing’,referstotheontological

ratherthantheonticlevel.WhatHeideggercalls‘technology’wewouldmore

likelycallanattitudetowardtheworldandourselvesinwhicheverything

appearsasaresource.Heidegger’sclaimthatweliveinatechnologicalage

wouldthenberoughlyequivalenttothenotionthatmodernculture

comprehendseverythingasapotentialobjectoftechnicalaction.

Theontic,bycontrast,isthelevelofempiricalobjects,ofactualmachines

andthenaturetheytransform,ofourownneedsandactivities,hencealsoof

politicalstrifeandstruggle.The‘ontologicaldifference’appearstoinsulate

theonefromtheother.Onticpoliticalstrugglesoverthedesignofdevices

cannotchangetheontologicaldispensationwithinwhichtheworldappearsas

technological.Or,againinmyroughtranslation,onecan’tchangethe

fundamentalbackgroundassumptionsofaculturebyenactingtheminthisor

thatparticularsituation.Theinsulationoftheontologicalfromtheontichas

Heidegger’sPhilosophyofTechnology 447

anotherimplicationforHeidegger’sdefenders:nomatterhowreactionary

mostofHeidegger’sstatementsaboutparticulartechnologies(theontic),that

doesnotaffectthebasicsoundnessofhis(ontological)theoryoftheessence

oftechnology.Infact,itispossibletoargue,asThomsondoes,that

Heideggerwas‘basically’reconciledwithtechnologydespitehisfrequent

complaintsaboutthisorthatdevice(powerplants,television,typewriters,

etc.)ThomsondrawsonthesedistinctionstoclarifyHeidegger’sintent.He

claimsthattheessenceoftechnologyisnotagenusunderwhichmodern

technologieswouldfallasparticularinstances,butanontologicalhappening

ofsomesort.Eachparticular,Heideggerwrites,‘belongsasstockpart,

availableresource,orexecuter,withinEnframing;butEnframingisneverthe

esssenceoftechnologyinthesenseofagenus.Enframingisawayof

revealing...’,etc.(1977,p.29).Thisisanimportantpointanditobligesme

torethinkmyargument,butaswewillseeIcometothesameconclusion.

Heidegger’spositionseemsconfusingat Ž rstglance:whatsensedoesit

maketocallsomethinganessenceifitisnotthegenusofthatwhichitnames?

ThewholeHeideggeriantheoryriskscollapsingintosemantictrivialityifhe

isemployingtheword‘technology’torefertosomethingnoonewould

normallyrefertoassuch.AsinThomson’scritique,soinearlierdiscussions

withHeideggerians,Ihavenotreceivedasimpleanddirectanswertothis

obviousobjectionbutratherelaborateaccountsofHeidegger’sconceptof

essence.Theseaccountsareinteresting,butdonotaddressthebasicproblem,

whichisthelink(orabsencethereof)betweentechnologyasamodeof

revealingandactualtechnologicaldevices.

IamprovokedbyThomson’scritiqueintotryingonceagaintosolvethis

problem.Ibelievethereisawaytoshowthatenframingisatleastnot

primarily agenusintheusualsense.Considertheparallelcaseofcultureor

language.Culturallyencodedbehaviororspeecharenotparticularsinthe

samewayinwhich,forexample,redpaintisaninstanceofthegenusredora

coffeecupaninstanceofthegenuscup.Thereasonisthatcultureand

languageareenacted,andtheenactmentsreproducethemconcretelyrather

thansimplyinstantiatingthem.Or,toputittheotherwayaround,cultureand

languagearenotsimplyabstractionsfromparticularinstancesofbehavior

andspeech,buthaveastrangekindofreality‘in’thelatter,shapingthemand

beingshapedbytheminturn.CultureandlanguagearethuswhatHegel

called‘concreteuniversals’–theyexistintheirinstances–incontrastwith

abstractuniversalsthataresimplegeneralizationsfromparticulars.

Heideggerindicatesthatthisisthesortofdistinctionhewantstomake

whenhesays,‘Ifwespeakofthe“essenceofahouse”andthe“essenceofa

state,”wedonotmeanagenerictype;ratherwemeanthewaysinwhichthe

houseandstateholdsway,administerthemselves,developanddecay–the

wayinwhichthey“essence”[ Wesen ]’(1977,p.30).

Asaconcreteuniversal,weshouldexpectto Ž ndenframingenactedin

448 AndrewFeenberg

particulartechnologicalarrangementsandtechnicallyinspiredbehaviors.

Thisaccountsforthefactthateventhoughhedeniesthatenframingisa

genus,Heideggerreferstoitconstantlyindescribingtheworkingsofactual

technologiesandtechnicalactions.Thefamoushydroelectricplantonthe

Rhine,whichcomesoffsopoorlyincomparisonwithHo¨lderlin’shymntothe

river,isacaseinpoint.Heideggerdoesnotwanttodescribeitasamere

instanceoftheideaofenframing,buthedoesshowhowitenactsenframing

bytransformingthemeaningoftheriver:‘Whattheriverisnow,namelya

waterpowersupplier,derivesfromoutoftheessenceofthepowerstation’

(1977,p.16).

IfIamrightinthisinterpretationofHeidegger’senigmaticclaimthatthe

essenceoftechnologyisnotthegenusunderwhichparticulartechnologiesfall,

agreatmanythingsbecomeclear.Mostimportantly,webegintoseewhy,

contraThomson,itmatterssoverymuchthatHeidegger’sanalysesofparticular

technologiesareoftenin � uencedbyromantictechnophobia.Wecannotcleanly

separatethetheoryofenframingfromtheseregressiveattacksonparticular

technologiesbecausetheyareofapiece.Animpoverishedgeneraltheoryis

herere � ectedinanimpoverishedunderstandingofparticulars.Iwouldliketo

concludewithanexampleI Ž ndparticularlyrevealing.

TheexampleIhavechosenre � ectswhatIsaidearlierofHeidegger’s

nihilism.Wewill Ž ndhimsurrenderingeverythingto‘technology’,inhis

senseoftheterm,inadvanceandinthisinstanceinerrorratherthanseeking

thosemarginalpotentialsthatcouldbeactualizedthroughprogressivehuman

agency.Inthis,Heidegger’spositionconcurswithacertainpostmodernism

whichhasindeedrecognizedaprecursorinhim.

OnepostmoderntrendHeideggeranticipatedistheradicaltransformation

ofcultureundertheimpactofthecomputer.Inarecentlypublishedspeech

Heideggergavein1962toteachersinthecontinuingeducationsystemofthe

Germanuniversity,heexplainsthedifferencebetweenlanguageassaying,as

revealingtheworldbyshowingandpointing,andlanguageasmeresign,

transmittingamessage,afragmentofalreadyconstitutedinformation.The

perfectionofspeechispoetry,whichopenslanguagetobeing.Theperfection

ofthesignistheunambiguouspositionofaswitch–onoroff–asinMorse

codeorthememoryofacomputer.Heideggerwrites:

Thestructureandperformanceofmainframecomputersystems[ Großrechenanlagen ]

restsonthetechno-calculativeprinciplesofthistransformationoflanguageassaying

intolanguageasamerereportofsignaltransmissions.Whatisdecisiveforour

re � ectionliesinthefactthatitisfromthetechnologicalpossibilitiesofthemachine

thattheinstructionissetoutastohowlanguagecanandshouldbelanguage.Thekind

andcharacteroflanguagearedeterminedaccordingtothetechnologicalpossibilities

oftheformalsignaltransmissionswhichexecuteasequenceofcontinualyes–no

decisionswiththehighestpossiblespeed....Thekindoflanguageisdeterminedby

thetechnology(1998,p.140,translationmodi Ž ed).

Heidegger’sPhilosophyofTechnology 449

AndlikeLyotard,Heideggergoesontoannouncetheendofhumanistic

cultureundertheimpactofthecomputer.

Allthismakesfunreadingforphilosophers,butitisembarrassinglywide

ofthemark.Whathasactuallyhappenedtolanguageinaworldmoreand

moredominatedbycomputers?Hasitinfactbeenrei Ž edintoatechnical

discoursepuri Ž edofhumansigni Ž cance?Onthecontrary,theInternetnow

carriesaveritabletidalwaveof‘saying’,oflanguageusedforexpressionas

alwaysinthepast.Ofcourse,wemaynotbeinterestedinmuchofthisonline

talk,butthatisanotherstory.Thesimplefactofthecaseisthatthese‘post-

humanist’re � ectionsonthecomputerwerewrong.Theynotonlyfailedto

foreseethetransformationofthecomputerintoacommunicationmedium,

buttheyprecludedthatpossibilityforessentialreasons(Feenberg,[1995,chs

6and7]).

Ah,butwastheerroronticorontological?Inconsideringthisquestionit

becomesclearwhythewallbetweenthetworealmsbreaksdown.Underlying

theonticanalysisofthecomputerthereisanontologicalpresupposition

accordingtowhichtechnologyintroducesapeculiarlyimpersonalformof

dominationintohumanaffairs.Thispresuppositionisthenplayedoutatthe

onticlevelintheseemingenactmentofimpersonalityandcontrolinthe

unambiguouspositioningofthedigitalswitch.Theresulting‘aggressionof

technicallanguageagainstthepropercharacteroflanguageisatthesame

timeathreatagainsttheproperessenceofman’(Heidegger[1990,pp.40–

41]).Nowwearereturnedtotheontologicallevel.Theontologicalappearsin

theontic;theonticstrikesbackattheontological.Thetwoarelinkedin

Heidegger’sdiscourse,notseparate,ashisinterpretersclaim.IfHeidegger

rejectsattemptstocontroltechnologyintheinterestofhumanvalues,thisis

notbecausetechnology,asontological,isinsulatedbyde Ž nitionfrommerely

onticaction,butbecauseinhisviewallcontrolistechnologicalandsomust

reproducethe‘same’.

Becauseofthissubterraneanlinkage,ontologicalpresuppositionsintrude

unacceptablyontheonticlevel.Thatisthesourceoftheerroneousevaluation

ofthecomputer.Thechainofequivalences,whichrunsfromthe

impersonalityanddominationoftechnologyassuchdowntoparticular

devicessuchascomputers,getsinthewayofconcreteanalysis.Aserious

encounterwithparticulartechnologiesshowsthattheyhavemanydimensions

thatcanbeactualizedunderdifferentsocialandhistoricalcircumstances.

Technologyhasneverhadasinglemeaningsuchasenframingwhich

summedupallitspotentials.Nordoesitmakemuchmoresensetodescribe

ourcultureasuniquelyorientedtowarddomination.Theabilityofthe

computertomediatenormalhumanlanguageisnotastartlingreversalof

ontologicaltrends,butmerelyanexpressionofthecomplexityand � exibility

oftechnologythatisrevealedasitisappropriatedbyawiderrangeofactors.

WhatconclusiondoIdrawfromthesere � ections?IdothinkHeidegger’s

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