Heidegger, Analytic Metaphysics.pdf

Inquiry ,45,35–58

Heidegger,AnalyticMetaphysics,andthe

BeingofBeings

MatthewRatcliffe

UniversityCollegeCork

ThisessaybeginswithanoutlineoftheearlyHeidegger’sdistinctionbetweenbeings

andtheBeing 1 ofthosebeings,followedbyadiscussionofHeideggerianteleology.

Itthenturnstocontemporaryanalyticmetaphysicstosuggestthatanalytic

metaphysicsconcernsitselfwhollywith beings anddoesnotrecognizedistinctforms

ofquestioningconcerningwhatHeideggercalls Being .Thisdifferencehavingbeen

clarified,studiesofidentityandindividuationintheanalytictraditionareexamined

anditisdemonstratedthatsuchinquirieshavefarmoreincommonwithHeidegger

thanonemightinitiallysuspect.Indeed,itturnsoutthatmuchofwhattheearly

HeideggersaysaboutBeingistacitlypresupposedbytheworkingsofcertainbeing-

centricmetaphysicalprojectsintheanalytictradition.Thediscussionconcludeswith

thesuggestionthatthecentraldifferencebetweenthetwoprojectsshouldbe

understoodasoneofemphasisandthatHeidegger’sdiscussionofBeingandarealist

metaphysicsintheanalytictraditioncancomplementeachotherasaspectsofa

broader,moreunifiedphilosophicalinquiry.

I.HeideggerontheBeingofBeings 2

Iamcurrentlylookingatanemptycoffeemug.Itisacertainkindofthing,it

isinaparticularplace,andItakeittobereal,bywhichImeanthatIconceive

ofitaspersistingregardlessofmyintentionalrelationshipwithit.Theworld

is Ž lledwithmyriaddifferentbeingslikethemug.Therearecars,birds,

rocks,houses,andcomputers,forexample.Allhaveincommonan

‘otherness’orindependencefromme,areofacertaintype,andhavea

certainlocation.Ofanysuchbeingwecanask‘whatisit?;whereisit?;isit

reallywhatIthinkitis?’Beingsknittogetherinvariousways(ofwhichI

shallsaymoreinII).Forexample,Idonotconceiveofmycomputeras

entirelyindependentfromtheprinter,thenotesIreferto,andarangeofother

itemsthatrelatetomycurrentactivities.Forconvenience,Ishallcallthe

interconnectedtotalityofextantbeings‘theworld’.Thisis,atleast,what

manyanalyticmetaphysicianswouldtake‘theworld’tobe. 3

Asametaphysician,giventheconceivabilityof‘worldasacollectionof

interrelatedbeings’,Imightinquireastowhichentitiesaregenuinelyrealand

canexistindependentlyofmyintentionalrelationtothem;Imightinquireas

# 2002Taylor&Francis

36 MatthewRatcliffe

towhichentitiesaremostfundamentalinmy‘map’ofthereal,andImight

inquireastotheextenttowhichanymetaphysicscanapproximatethe

structureofreality.Allthesequestionsconcernbeingswhichhave

‘whatness’,‘whereness’,and‘othernessfromoneself’.However,Heidegger

( BT , BPP) suggeststhatthereareimportantphilosophicalquestionswhichwe

neglectifwecon Ž neourselvessolelytoastudyofbeings( Seiende ).These

questionsconcernBeing( Sein ).AnunderstandingofBeingiswhatmust

alreadybethecaseforacontextureofbeings,anobjectiveworld,tobe

intelligible:

Intheendsomethingisgivenwhichmustbegivenifwearetobeabletomakethings

accessibletousasbeingsandcomportourselvestowardthem,somethingwhich,tobe

sure,isnotbutwhichmustbegivenifwearetoexperienceandunderstandanybeings

atall.( BPP §2,p.10)

Heideggerisnotsuggestingthatwemusthaveanimplicitunderstandingof

some thing ,whichiscausallyorepistemologicallyrequiredpriortoan

explicitunderstandingofbeings.Heisaskingakindof primordialsemantic

question ,bywhichImeanthatheisinquiringintotheimplicitsemantic

structureswhicharepriortothesenseofanyexplicitconceptionofanything

andarepreconditionallyrequiredtorenderbeingsintelligibleas whatthey

are :Whatmustalreadybethecaseforarealworldtobethinkable?Whatis

alreadyrequiredforustobeabletogivesenseto‘otherness’,‘extantness’,

‘whatness’,‘whereness’,‘reality’?HenceBeing,whichispriortothe

intelligibilityofbeings,itselfhasnoneofthecharacteristicsofbeings;‘the

Beingofbeings“is”notitselfabeing’( BT §2,p.26).

Beingisnotstrictlyspeaking real ,butthenneitherisit unreal ;itisrequired

foranyconceptionof reality tobeintelligibleandisitselfpriortosuch

distinctions. 4 HenceinquiringintothenatureofBeingdoesnotentailthat

whatwetaketoberealisnotinfactrealorthatthereissomemore

fundamentallyreal thing-in-itself thatlies beyond oureverydaysenseof

reality.Beingconcernswhatmustbethecaseforquestionsconcerning

whethertheworldisrealorunrealtomakesense;itconstitutestheverysense

ofsuchquestionsasopposedtounderminingthem.ToquestionBeingisnot

todenythatquestionsconcerningwhatisrealcanbelegitimatelyasked.

Indeedsuchquestionshavethesamesensethattheyalwaysdid.Inother

words,theunderstandingofBeingisawhollydifferentexercise,whichcan

happilycoexistwitharealistinquiryandispresupposedbythevery

intelligibilityofsuchinquiry,anobservationwhichIshallreturntoinV.

HenceHeideggerplacesa Ž rmdistinctionbetweenBeingandbeings,

whichhecalls‘theontologicaldifference’.ThequestioningofBeingcannot

implyscepticism,idealismoranyotherdoctrineconcerningourrelationship

toreality,asforsuchdebatestoevenmakesense,anunderstandingofBeing

Heidegger,AnalyticMetaphysics,andtheBeingofBeings 37

ispresupposed.Itisrequiredforanyclaimabouttheworldorourrelationship

totheworldtobeintelligible:‘Ifwedidnotunderstandwhatrealitymeans,

thentherealwouldremaininaccessible’( BPP §2,p.10). 5 Beingisthus

fundamentalor,rather, original andcannotbeapproachedbyanyformof

questioningthatsimplypresupposestheintelligibilityofbeings.

Ishallnowtakeacloserlookatsomeofthespeci Ž csofHeidegger’s

accountofBeing.Myaiminsodoingistodrawoutanumberofinterrelated

claimsthatarecentraltotheaccount,ratherthantoofferacomprehensive

exegesisofanypartoftheearlyHeidegger’sposition.Therelevanceofthese

claimsforcontemporaryanalyticmetaphysicsisdiscussedinIV.

II.Heidegger,Being,andConstitutiveTeleology

IfBeingissomethinggivenpriortoanyconfrontationwithbeings,itisbyno

meansclearhowwecouldevercometoanexplicitunderstandingofBeingor

evenbegintoquestionBeing.IfanunderstandingofBeingisalwaysinthe

background,howcanweallowthatunderstandingtoexplicitlyshowitself?If

allthatwedopresupposesBeing,howcanweevergetatit?

Heideggerrecognizesthisproblemandgoestogreatlengthsto

demonstratethatthehistoryofphilosophyisbeing-centric;thatour

metaphysicalinquirieshaveinvariablytakenfeaturesofextantbeings

( Vorhandenes ),suchas‘whatness’oressence,existenceasextantness, res

extensa and rescogitans ( BPP §4,p.15,andallofPartOne)tobemost

fundamentaltoourunderstandingofworld.QuestionsconcerningBeing

collapseintoaccountsofthemostfundamentalfeaturesofbeings,withthe

resultthatanysenseofadistinctivequestioningofBeingislost.Forexample,

KantisportrayedasdistinguishingBeingfrombeingswithhisclaimthat

existenceisnotarealpredicate(‘KantbasicallywantstosaythatBeingisnot

abeing’[ BPP §9,p.55])butasfailingtoreachafullerunderstandingof

Being,confusingitwithlocationandaddinganambiguousperceptual

criterion.

TheKantiancategoriesservetoconstituteoursenseoftheextantworldand

canthusbeconstruedasanattempttocharacterizeBeing–thatwhichmust

alreadybethecasefortheworldtobethinkable.ButHeideggerclaimsthat

KantstillendsuppresupposinganunderstandingofBeing,forexampleinhis

construalofthe thing-in-itself asanineffablerealitywhichourconstituted

phenomenalworldcanonlyaspiretoandinfallingintoadivisionbetween

subjectandobject,whosecharacterizationpresupposesaconceptionof

extantness( Vorhandenheit ):

Intheconceptofthething-in-itself,whetherornotitisknowableinitswhatness,the

traditionalontologyofextantnessisalreadycontained.[ BPP 14,p.147][andfor

38 MatthewRatcliffe

Kant]thequestionoftheBeingoftheDasein 6 assuchissimplynotraised.The

subjectremainswiththeindifferentcharacterizationofbeinganextantentity.( BPP §

14,p.153) 7

SoHeideggerseesKant’saccountofBeingaslapsingbackintotheextant

andthusmisconstruingthenatureofBeing. 8 Heclaimsthatpreviousthinkers

haveallinvariouswaysmisunderstoodBeingorpresupposeditbytakingthe

conceivabilityofanextantworldasagiven.AllaccountsofBeing,he

suggests,eventuallyfallbackintoanontologyofbeings,whichisinvariably

takenasanimplicitgiven.

HowthenarewetoinvestigateBeing?Howarewetogetpastanimplicit

andall-pervasiveacceptanceofanextantontology,asenseofwhoseBeingis

simplypresupposed?Heideggerbeginsbyquestioningtheassumptionthat

extantbeings( Vorhandenes )areinfactprimaryandfundamentalinour

understandingofworld.WhyshouldweassumethatanaccountoftheBeing

ofbeingsshouldemphasizeonekindofbeingoverallothers;thosebeings

thatareepitomizedbythedetached,theoreticalentitieswhichtheobjective

sciencescharacterize?

Totaketheemphasisawayfromextantbeings,Heideggerobservesthat,in

muchofoureverydayinteractionwiththeworld,wearenotsomuch

concernedwithdetached,theoreticalentitiesbutwiththatwhichisavailable

orready-to-hand( zurHand );aholisticmatrixofequipment( Zeug )with

whichweareinextricablyinvolved.Beingsonlystandoutasextantbeings

againstthisbackgroundofequipment.AsHeideggerputsit,‘thepresence-at-

hand[ Vorhandenheit ]whichmakesitselfknownisstillboundupinthe

readiness-to-hand[ Zuhandenheit ]ofequipment’( BT §16,p.104).Atoolis

transparentlyavailabletousasapieceofequipmententwinedinaframework

ofgoals,purposes,andactions.Onlywhenitbreaks,goesmissing,

malfunctions,orcan’tforsomereasonbesmoothlyandimplicitlyintegrated

intoaholisticteleologicalnetworkofequipment,doesitshowitselfasan

extantbeing.Thusweareactivelyentwinedwiththeworldasitisontically

closesttousandextantnessisonlyconceivablewhentheworld‘rebels’

againstourprojects,exposingaprojectasateleologicalstructurethatreveals

theextantonlythroughitscollapse(e.g. BT §16,p.105).

Giventheonticprimacyofinvolvementwithequipmentovercontempla-

tionofextantentities,itseemsthat,contrarytohistoricallyprevalent

assumptions, 9 aninquiryintotheBeingofbeingswillbebetteroffstarting

withequipmentratherthanwiththeoreticalentities.SoHeideggerasks,What

mustalreadybethecaseforholisticframeworksofequipmenttobe

intelligible?WhatisrequiredtogivemeaningtotheBeingofequipment?He

claimsthatequipment‘isconstitutedbya contextureofthewhat-for , in-

order-to ’( BPP §15,pp.163–4);that‘thefunctionalitythatgoeswithchair,

table,windowisexactlythatwhichmakesthethingwhatitis’( BPP §15,p.

Heidegger,AnalyticMetaphysics,andtheBeingofBeings 39

164).Wedonotcomeacrossanequipmentalbeing Ž rstasanobjectiveentity

andonlythenashavingacertainfunctionoruse.Insteada‘speci Ž c

functionalitywholeis pre -understood’( BPP ,p.164).Inordertoconceiveof

any x asapieceofequipmentwithinabroaderequipmentalcontexture–in

ordertoconceiveofitasthethingthatitis–abackgroundoffunctionalityis

invariablypresupposed.Equipmentisthus constituted 10 byitsfunctionality:

Thespeci Ž c thisness ofapieceofequipment,its individuation ,ifwetakethewordin

acompletelyformalsense,isnotdeterminedprimarilybyspaceandtimeinthesense

thatitappearsinadeterminatespace-andtime-position.Instead,whatdeterminesa

pieceofequipmentasanindividualisitsequipmentalcharacterandequipmental

contexture....Abeingisnotwhatandhowitis,forexample,ahammer,andthenin

additionsomething‘withwhichtohammer’.Rather,whatandhowitisasthisentity,

its whatness and howness ,isconstitutedbythisin-order-toassuch,byits

functionality.( BPP §20,pp.292–3)

Heideggerthencontendsthatfunctionalityitselfpresupposesamorebasic

teleology;‘allfunctionalityisgroundedinamoreoriginal“for-the-sake-of-

which”’( BPP §20,p.295).Thisteleologyisaninextricableaspect(or

moment)ofaholisticstructurethatheterms‘Care’( Sorge )andCareis

presupposedbytheintelligibilityofanybeing.

WhatabouttheBeingofextantbeings?ThoughHeideggerplacesan

emphasisonthepracticaloverthetheoretical,itisclearthathedoesnotseek

togroundalltheoreticalcognitioninthepractical;hedoesnotwanttoclaim

that Vorhandenheit isconstitutedby Zuhandenheit .Justasattentiontothe

phenomenologyof Zuhandenheit suggeststhat‘toreconstructtheThingof

useintermsoftheThingofNatureisanontologicallyquestionable

undertaking’atbest( BT §20,p.132),itisjustasmisleadingtogroundall

theoryinpractice.Alltheoreticalcognitionissomehow‘boundup’( BT §16,

p.104)inpracticalcognitionbutitisnotconstitutedbyit.Sohowdoes

Heideggerconceiveoftherelationshipbetween Vorhandenheit and

Zuhandenheit ?Theanswer,Ithink,lieswithCare( Sorge ).Heideggermakes

quiteclearthathisconceptionofCaredoesnotimplyanultimately

pragmatistaccountofbeingsandtheirBeing:

Care,asaprimordialstructuraltotality,lies‘before’[“ vor ”]everyfactical‘attitude’

and‘situation’ofDasein,anditdoessoexistentially apriori ;thismeansthatitalways

lies in them.Sothisphenomenonbynomeansexpressesapriorityofthe‘practical’

attitudeoverthetheoretical.Whenweascertainsomethingpresent-at-handbymerely

beholdingit,thisactivityhasthecharacterofCarejustasmuchasdoesa‘political’

actionortakingarestandenjoyingoneself.‘Theory’and‘practice’arepossibilitiesof

Beingforanentity[Seiende]whoseBeingmustbede Ž nedas‘Care’.( BT §41,p.238)

SoHeideggercontendsthat both theoreticalentities and practicalengagement

areconstitutedbyCare,andanessentialmomentofCareisitsteleological

Plik z chomika:

Inne pliki z tego folderu:

Inne foldery tego chomika: