Heidegger, Being, Truth, Presence.pdf

Inquiry ,41,45±64

Being,Truth,andPresenceinHeidegger’s

Thought

FrederickA.Olafson

UniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego

AlthoughthestatusoftheconceptofbeinginHeidegger’sthoughtisstillthesubject

ofcontroversy,textuallyitisquiteclearthatheheldthefundamentalcharacterof

beingtobepresence.Accordingly,thispaperisnotconcernedtoshowthatthiswas

indeedHeidegger’sconceptionofbeing.Instead,itundertakestomakea

philosophicalcasefortheprimafacieparadoxicalthesisthatbeingispresence.It

doessobyfirsttakingupHeidegger’saccountoftruthinwhichitisidentifiedwith

themodeofbeingof Dasein andthuswiththe`uncoveredness’( Entdecktheit )of

entitiesthat Dasein effects.Thisleadstoareviewoftraditionalconceptionsof

being.Iarguethatbeingisnotjustthecharacterthatmakesanentitythekindof

entityitis;itisthatentity’sbe-ingwhateveritis.Assuch,ithasthestructureofa

stateofaffairsanditisastateofaffairsthatmakesstatementsorthoughtsaboutit

trueorfalseasthecasemaybe.Butastateofaffairsisnotapartorapropertyof

theentityitisabout.Aswhatmakesatruestatementtrue,Iargue,itbelongstothe

contextoftruthandtherebyofpresence.Inafinalsection,therelevanceofthese

matterstocontemporaryphilosophicaldiscussionistakenup.

Atthebeginningof BeingandTime ( BT )Heideggerstatesthatthegoalof

hisinquiryistheconceptofbeingassuch.Alittlelater,healsomakesit

clearthatbeingisalwaysthebeingofentitiesÐ dasSeindesSeienden Ðand

thatitistobeunderstoodinthebroadestpossiblesense.Itincludesboththe

`What’andthe`That’ofentities,theirbeingsuch-and-suchandtheirbeing

uÈberhaupt Ðwhatisusuallycalledtheirexistence.Because BT wasnever

completed,theconceptofbeingassuchtowardwhichHeideggerwas

workingdoesnotemergeinthatworkaswehaveit.Thishasledmany

studentsofHeidegger’sthoughttoconcludethathisprojectmusthaveended

infailureandthatithadbeenmisconceivedinsomewaywhichled

Heideggerhimselftoabandonit.This,inturn,wouldsuggestthathehad

concludedthattheconceptofbeingassuchcouldnotbereachedbytheroute

hehadchosenÐaroutethatledthroughananalysisofhumanbeing( Dasein )

astheentitythatalreadyhasatleastsomefamiliaritywithbeingassuch.

ThisverdicthasseemedtobeconfirmedbythewayHeideggersubsequently

turnedawayfrom Dasein anddeveloped,inhislaterworks,anaccountof

46 FrederickA.Olafson

beingassuchinwhichhumanbeingdidnotappeartofigureatall

prominently.

ThepublicationofHeidegger’slecturesfromthisperiodhascastnewlight

onallthesematters.Inmyview,theyshowconclusivelythattheviewof BT

asanabandonedtorsoismistaken.Mostrelevantly,thelecturesfromthe

SummerSemesterof1927Ðtheyear BT waspublishedÐgivethegistof

whatHeideggerevidentlyintendedtosayabout`TimeandBeing’in

DivisionThreeofPartIof BT . 1 Hesketchestherethethesisthatbeingas

suchistobeunderstoodaspresenceÐinGerman, Anwesenheit or PraÈsenz .

ThisisalsoHeidegger’srenderingoftheGreekword, ousia ,whichisusually

translatedsimplyas`being’.Unfortunately,thisuseoftheword Anwesenheit

hascausedgreatconfusionbecausein BT Heideggercriticizedaconception

ofbeingas Anwesenheit thathealsoattributedtotheGreeks.Itseemed

impossiblethatheshouldespousetheveryconceptofbeingthathehadso

plainlyrejected;andsothepassagesinwhichheappearedtodosohave

oftenbeeninterpretedasdiscussionsofthatsameerroneousconceptandas

innowaycommittingHeideggertoit. 2

ThereisanexplanationbyHeideggerhimselfofthisapparentanomaly.In

hislecturehetellsusthathewastrying,asheputsit,to`radicalize’the

Greekconceptionofbeing( ousia )as Anwesenheit /presence. 3 Althoughthe

Greekswereontherighttrack,heargues,theyfailedtomakeaplacefor

timeinthewaytheyunderstoodbeingaspresence.Accordingly,

Heidegger’sthemewastobebeingandtime;andthe`radicalizing’of

whichhespeakswasaccomplishedbytheintroductionoftimeintheformof

temporalityinDivision2ofPartIof BT .Atransitionwastherebymediated

fromtheanalysisof Dasein toanaccountofbeingassuchinDivision3.Itis

thusanenrichedtemporalconceptof Anwesenheit /presencethatHeidegger

proposesastheconceptofbeing.

Inthissameconnection,itshouldbenotedthatthereisnoconflict

betweenthisaccountofHeidegger’sconceptofbeingandtheincomplete

stateof BT .NotonlywasHeideggerconvincedthatnoonehadcorrectly

understoodwhathewastryingtodoin BT ;healsomadeitclearthathewas

notsatisfiedwithsomeofthecharacteristicformulationsinthatwork. 4 This

doesnotmeanthattheworkasawholehadbeenmisconceivedorthatthe

identificationofbeingwithpresencewasupforrevision.Instead,itwasthe

relationinwhichbeing( Sein )standstohumanbeing( Dasein )thatwasin

question.In BT ,theconceptof Dasein hadbeenpushedsofarintothe

foregroundthatitseemedasthoughanyconceptofbeingaspresencethat

wasreachedbythisroutewouldunavoidablymakebeingderivativefrom

Dasein .ItmayevenbethatatonetimeHeideggerwasalmostreadyto

acceptthatconclusion. 5 Butsince Dasein forallitsdistinctivenessasakind

ofentityremainedanentityÐ einSeiendes Ðthiscouldnotbefinally

acceptabletohim.Heinsistedstronglyonthedistinctionbetweenbeingand

Being,Truth,andPresence 47

entitiesandviewedtheconfusionoftheonewiththeotherastheprimordial

erroroftheWesternphilosophicaltradition.Insteadofmakingek-sistence,

themodeofbeingof Dasein ,thegroundofpresenceashehadatleast

appearedtodoin BT ,hemadepresencethegroundofek-sistence.Whathe

didnotdowassimplytojettison Dasein ashassometimesbeensupposed. 6

Mypurposeinthispaperisnottogooverthisgroundagain;Iwillsimply

takeitasgiventhatHeideggerdidworkoutaconceptofbeingassuchand

thatitwasaconceptofpresence.Thereare,however,twopointsthatneedto

bemadeherebeforeproceedingtotherealbusinessofthispaper:acritical

discussionoftheindependentphilosophicalmeritsofthisassociationof

beingwithpresence.Oneofthesehastodowiththequestionofwhetherthe

GreeksreallyhadaconceptofbeingaspresenceasHeideggerclaimsthey

did.ThisclaimhadanimportantplaceinthewayHeidegger’sown

conceptionofbeingaspresencewasintroduced.Unfortunately,theeffectof

thisappealtotheGreekswastoshort-circuitthesupportingargumenthe

wouldotherwisehavehadtogiveforhisconstrualofbeingbymakingit

appearthathewassimplyreinstatingtheoriginalconceptofbeingthatlater

becamedistortedoutofallrecognition.Asaresult,theproblematicaspects

ofthatidentificationneverreceivedthekindofcriticalscrutinythatwas

requiredifitwastobevalidated.

ThepointIwanttomakeaboutthisisthatitisreallyimmaterialwhether

theGreeksdidordidnothavesuchaconcept.Heideggerhimselfconcedes

thattherewasnoactualuseamongtheGreeksof` ousia ’,allbyitself,to

signifypresence;andsohiscasehastorestmainlyonthefactthat ousia

turnsupintwoGreekwordsÐ parousia and apousia Ðthatdomean

`presence’and`absence’. 7 Heidegger’sclaimisthat ousia ,understoodas

presence,isthecommonelementinthesetwoconcepts.Forthistomake

senseithastobeunderstoodthatHeideggerconstruesabsenceasamodality

ofpresence.Whenwelookforsomeonesomewhereanditturnsoutthat,like

Sartre’sfamousPierre,heisnotthere,thatperson,itmightbesaid,ispresent

inabsence.Thiswouldmake ousia /presencethesuperordinateconceptfor

bothpresenceasitisordinarilyunderstoodandabsenceasthisparadoxical

kindofnegativepresence. 8 Plainly,though,anysuchconceptwouldbea

prettyout-of-the-waynotionanditsoccurrenceinalanguagecorrespond-

inglyhardtoestablish.Itmightjustbesimplertosuggestthatitisthe

prepositionsÐ para (beside)and apo (from)Ðandnot ousia itselfthatdothe

relevantworkinthesewords.

Thesecondpointthatneedstobemadehereconcernsaninferencethat

mightbedrawnÐerroneouslyÐfromHeidegger’scloseassociationofbeing

assuchwithpresence.BecausepresenceisarelationalconceptÐitisalways

presencetosomeoneÐHeidegger’sthesiscouldbeinterpretedasentailing

thatwhateverisor,inordinaryparlance,existswillhavetobepresentto

someone.Heideggerhimselfmightbethoughttobeendorsingthisstrange

48 FrederickA.Olafson

conclusionwhenhetiesbeing,inthesenseheispostulating,totheexistence

ofthekindofentitytowhichsomethingcanbepresent,i.e.anentityofthe

Dasein type:no Dasein ,nobeing. 9

Infact,anysuchinferencewouldcompletelydistortHeidegger’slineof

thought.Itassumesthat`being’denotesentitiesÐtheonesweusuallythink

ofasmakingupthetotalitywecall`theworld’.Butherepeatedlyinsiststhat

althoughbeingisalwaysthebeingofentities,entities( Seiendes )are

independentofthebeingorpresencethataccruestothem.Itfollowsthat

nothinghesaysaboutthetie-inbetweenbeingand Dasein appliestothem.

Evidently,then,thebeingofentitieshastobethoughtofassomehow

superveninguponthemandentitiesthemselvesasdetachablefromtheir

being.Theidentificationofbeingwithpresencedoesnot,therefore,mean

thatnothingcanexistunlessanentitytowhichitcanbepresentdoes.It

meanssimplythatthesewouldbeentitieswithoutbeing.Admittedly,this

conclusionismorelikelytomystifythantosatisfy,especiallysinceitcanbe

statedonlybyauseoftheconceptofbeingthatitrulesout.Thesequestions,

however,canbestbedealtwithatalaterpointwhenthewholerelationship

ofbeingandpresencehasbeenmorecarefullyexamined.

Inmyjudgment,thebestapproachtothattopicisthroughHeidegger’s

conceptoftruthwhichis,inanycase,verycloselylinkedwiththatofbeing.

Perhapsthebest-knownaspectofhisaccountoftruthishiscritiqueofthe

correspondencetheoryoftruth.Thiscritiquehassometimesbeeninterpreted

asexpressingalackofinterest,onhispart,intruthasgettingthingsright.

Althoughthatcriticismisunjust,itistruethatHeidegger’sinterestintruth

wasprimarilyontologicalincharacterratherthanepistemological.Hewas

concernedtoshowthattruthhasamodeofbeingthatispassedoverand

effectivelyobscuredbycorrespondencetheories.Whatsuchtheoriesdois

postulateakindofmatchbetweenastateoftheworld,ontheonehand,and

athoughtorastatement,ontheother.Heideggerarguesthatnotonlyisthe

natureofthismatchitselfthoroughlyobscure,thetermsbetweenwhichitis

supposedtoholdareconceivedinanontologicallyinappropriatemanner.

Botharetreatedasentities,theonetypicallyphysicalandtheothermental,

butbotharething-likeinnature.Thisisbecausetheyaretreatedasitemsthat

simplyturnup(andthatwecomeupon,asitwere)intheonedomainandthe

other.Theyarethus,inHeidegger’sterminology, vorhanden (present-at-

hand).Inthisway,theavailabilityofthesetermsthemselvestoanyonewho

mighttrytomakeacomparison,andthusestablishamatch,betweentheone

andtheotherissimplybeingassumed.Heideggerinterpretsthisavailability

asthe`uncoveredness’( Entdecktheit )ofthetermsinquestionandheholds

Being,Truth,andPresence 49

thatuncoverednesstobeessentialtothetruthrelation.Whatthiscomes

downtoisthefactthatsomething`showsitself’and,bydoingso,istherefor

orpresenttosomeoneÐthatis,toanentitythatissuchthatitcanuncover

somethingorhavesomethingpresenttoit.Whenthisuncoverednessis

passedover,truthisreducedtoarelationbetweenentitiesthatareconceived

aslogicallyandontologicallydistinctfromoneanother,andself-contained

inawaythatmakesitaltogetherobscurehowtheoneÐthethoughtor

statementÐcouldbeinanywayanuncoveringoftheother.

AlthoughHeideggerdidnotusetheterm`presence’intheradicalized

temporalsensein BT ,itisclearthattheuncoverednessofwhichhespeaks

thereisasynonymforpresence. 10 Itisaremarkablefactthatinspiteofall

theattentionthatphilosophershavegiven,inrecentdecades,tothereference

ofwordstothings,therehasbeennoacknowledgementofthefactthatthis

sameuncoveredness/presenceofthingsisanecessaryconditionforsuch

reference.Whenwordsareconceivedasword-things,andwhenthings,

generally,areconceivedinawaythatacknowledgesnodistinctionbetween

theirstatusassimplyactualandaspresent,referencebecomesatransaction

ofsomekindbetweenwhatareineffecttwoobjects.Thetroubleisthat,

amongtherelationsinwhichobjectsintheworldstandtooneanother,there

simplyarenoplausiblecandidatesfordesignationassucharelation;nothing

thatsuchentitiesdoorarecanestablishthatoneisthereferenceofanother.

Theresulthasbeenthatwordsandthingstakeonthestatusofparalleland

independentsetsofobjectsinaconditionofwhatHeideggercalls`side-by-

side-ness’( Nebeneinandersein ).Intheabsenceofanyaccountoftherelation

thatissupposedtoconstitutereference,wecanonlyrelyontheprior(and

tacit)understandingweallhaveofthemodalityofpresence(inabsence)by

whichwordsmediatethepresenceofthings.Thefactthatthisunderstanding

isindependentof,andinalllikelihoodirreconcilablewith,anyconceptionof

wordsasword-thingsiskeptdiscreetlyinthebackground. 11

Heideggersumsuphisdiscussionoftruthbysayingthat`weareinthe

truth’.Bythathemeans,notthatwearealwaysright,butthatsincebeing-in-

the-worldisourdistinctivemodeofbeing,weliveinthepresenceofthings

intheworldwhichshowthemselvestousaswhattheyare.Thismayseema

veryparadoxicalclaim,sincethingssooftenshowthemselvestousaswhat

theyarenot,as,forexample,inperceptualillusionsofvariouskinds.

Arguably,however,anillusioninwhich,say,aroundpennylookselliptical

doesshowussomethingaboutthepennyÐnamely,thewayitlookswhen

viewedfromacertainangle.Ifwedonotknowthatthisellipticallookisone

inaseriesofaspectsthepennycanpresenttous,wemayindeedthinkthatit

cannotbeawayinwhicharoundpennyispresent.Ifwedounderstandthat

fact,however,thesupposeddifficultydisappearsand,withit,theobstacleto

a`realistic’wayofconceivingpresence.

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