Heidegger, Truth, And Reference.pdf

Inquiry ,45,217–28

Symposium:CristinaLafont, Heidegger,Language,andWorld-disclosure *

Heidegger,Truth,andReference

MarkA.Wrathall

BrighamYoungUniversity

Twoofthebest-knownfeaturesofHeidegger’sthoughtarehisanalysisof

truthintermsofdisclosureanduncovering,andhisinsistenceonthefactthat

wealwayslivein,andencountertheworldoutof,anunderstandingofbeing.

Theseclaimsoughttoberelevanttocontemporaryworkinthephilosophyof

languageandmind,butHeidegger’sfollowersarealltoooftenunableto

clearlyarticulatethebasis,theimplications,and,indeed,eventhecontentof

Heidegger’sviews.

ThegreatvirtueofCristinaLafont’s Heidegger,Language,andWorld-

disclosure isthecarefulandrigorouswayinwhichsheanalyzesand

examinesHeidegger’sviews.Sheproposesaclearinterpretationof

Heidegger’sviewsontruthandlanguage.Sheexaminesthetacitfoundations

oftheseviews(assheinterpretsthem),andsheexposestheuntenable

consequencesentailedbythem.Inparticular,shearguesthatHeideggergives

a‘constitutiveranktolanguage’,bywhichshemeansthateverythingis

constitutedaswhatitisthroughandintermsofourlinguisticcategories.This

view,sheargues,‘givesrisetothemyth’inHeidegger‘thatthelimitsofmy

languagearethelimitsofmyworld’(p.8).Consequently,allthetruthsI

knoworcouldknowareonlytruerelativetomyhistoricallycontingentway

oflinguisticallyconstitutingtheworld.

Heidegger’sviewsoflanguageandtruth,Lafontconcludes,leadtoan

‘extremelinguisticidealism’.Becausewhatwecanexperienceisdirectlya

functionofwhatwealreadyknow,priortoanyexperience,shearguesthat

Heidegger’spositionentailsthatwecanneverlearnsomethingnew,never

reviseourbeliefsonthebasisofexperience,etc.(see,e.g.,p.248).Thus,her

bookamountstosomethingofa reductioadabsurdum ofacertainwayof

thinkingaboutlanguageandtruth.

ButisthiswayofthinkingreallyHeidegger’s?Ibelieveitisnot,andIthink

thatLafont’sinterpretationgoesastrayinthreeimportantrespects.First,

*CristinaLafont, Heidegger,Language,andWorld-disclosure ,trans.GrahamHarman

(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000),originallypublishedas Spracheund

Welterschliessung:ZurlinguistischenWendederHermeneutikHeideggers (Frankfurtam

Main:Suhrkamp,1994).AllunprefixedpagereferencesaretotheEnglishtranslation.

# 2002Taylor&Francis

218 MarkA.Wrathall

beingunderthespellofthe‘linguisticturn’inanalyticphilosophy,Lafont

insiststhatallmeaningislinguisticmeaningandreadsHeidegger

accordingly.Next,sheattributestoHeideggeran‘implicittheory’about

semantics–namely,thatmeaningdeterminesreference.Finally,she

interpretsHeidegger’sdoctrinesofdisclosureanduncoveringasaconfused

attempttode Ž netruthintermsofacriterionoftruth.Neithertheimplicit

assumptionsaboutmeaningandreferencenortheconfusionabouttruthare

fairlyattributabletoHeidegger.Intheremarksthatfollow,Ifocusprimarily

onthesecondofthesetraitsofLafont’sreading,butIalsotrytotouchonthe

Ž rstandthird.

Letmebeginbybrie � yreviewingLafont’sreadingofHeidegger.

Heidegger,accordingtoLafont,believesthat:

1.Allmeaning–eventhemeaningimplicitinanunderstandingofbeing–is

linguisticmeaning.

2.Meaning(theunderstandingofbeing)determinesreferenceinthesenseof

uniquely Ž xingtheobjectsthatarereferredto.

LafontclaimsthatHeideggerunderstands(2)‘instrictanalogywiththe

presuppositionsoftranscendentalphilosophy’and,asaconsequence,

believesthatmeaning‘determinesapriorianypossibleexperience’.Asa

result,whenwecombine(1)and(2)withathirdHeideggerianthesis:

3.Meaningisalwaysalreadygiven,

badconsequencesensue:inhabitantsofHeidegger-landarestuckinawayof

experiencingtheworldthathasanormativeclaimonusbutwhichweare

powerlesstorevise.Wegetaverybadmodelofthesciences,weloseall

objectivity,andarestuckinidealismandrelativism.

Fortunately,Lafontthinks,Heideggerwassimplyworkingwithabad

modeloflanguage.ThankstoDonnellanandPutnamandothers,sheargues,

wenowknowthat(2)isfalse.Lafontseemstoaccept(1)asnon-problematic,

andshethinksthatwithout(2)wearefreetoaccept(3)inatrivial,non-

threateningsense.

Ibelieve,however,thatHeideggeracceptsneither(1)nor(2).Andwithout

(1)and(2),(3)wouldnothaveallthecataclysmicconsequencesLafontfears.

ThemainpointthatIintendtoaddressisthecorrectnessofattributing(2)to

Heidegger.ButsincepartofLafont’sreasonforattributing(2)toHeidegger

isherbeliefthatheaccepts(1),Iwilladdress(1).

I.MeaningandReference

Inphilosophyoflanguage,thethesisthatmeaningdeterminesreference

(MDR)isathesisabouttherolethatcertaintermsplayin Ž xingthetruth

Heidegger,Truth,andReference 219

conditionsofasentence.TheideaofMDRissimplythatthemeaningofa

term 1 isinitselfsuf Ž cientto Ž xthereferenceoftheterm.Anyspeakerwho

understandsthemeaningofatermwillthereforehaveatleastimplicit

knowledgeoftheconditionsunderwhichanobjectcanbethereferentofthe

term.Onceanobjectisidenti Ž edasthereferentofthenamingterm,the

predicateofthesentencewilltellus(presumablyviaitssubjectivelygrasped

content)theconditionsunderwhichtheobjectismappedontoatruthvalue.

Thus,ifonecouldshowthat(atleastsometimes)somethingotherthanthe

meaningofthetermisneededto Ž xitsreferent,onewouldshowthatMDRis

false.Putnam,forinstance,arguesthatthereferenceofatermissometimes

Ž xedbysocialfactorslikethewayothersuseacertainterm.Inaddition,he

arguesthatreferencemightbedeterminedbyfeatureslikethemicrostructure

oftheobjectsnamedbytheterm. 2 Inbothcases,then,thereferencecanbe

determinedbyfeaturesofwhichwearepotentiallyignorantinusingtheterm.

Donnellanarguesthatitispossibletouseadescriptiontorefertosomething

which,infact,doesn’tsatisfythedescription.Thisisadifferentsortof

objectiontoMDRthanPutnam’s,butinbothcasestheargumentsaremeant

toshowthatthereferenceofatermcanbedeterminedotherwisethanbythe

subjectivelygraspedmeaningoftheterm.

IsthereanyreasontobelievethatHeideggeracceptsMDR?Thereis,on

thefaceofit,somethingalittleincongruousinattributingsuchaviewto

Heideggerinlightofhistotallackofinterestinprovidinganysortofdetailed

semantictheory.Notsurprisingly,givenhishostilitytotheoretical

approachestothestudyoflanguage,heneverexplicitlyadoptedaposition

inthestill-opendebateoverthewaynamingtermsfunctioninsuchatheory.

Lafontsuggests,however,thatseveralexplicitclaimsHeideggermakes

amounttoanendorsementofMDR.Andshearguesrepeatedlythatother

importantviewsHeideggerarticulatesonlymakesensegiventheassumption

ofMDR.I Ž ndnoneoftheseargumentspersuasive.

Beforeturningtothesearguments,acoupleofobservationsareinorder.

First,areminderthatLafontisattributingmuchmorethanasemantical

theorytoHeidegger.SheseesHeideggerasadoptingatranscendentalized

MDR,accordingtowhichoursubjectiveunderstandingofmeaningsgoverns

notjustwhatwecanrefertowithourwords,butwhatwecanexperiencein

senseperception.ForHeidegger,Lafontclaims,‘itisthroughthemeaningsof

theexpressionsweusethattheentitiesreferredtowiththeseexpressions

becomeaccessibleassuch.Inthisway,themeaningofaword,astheimplicit

descriptionofwhatitnames,determines“aswhat”and“ashow”thisappears

tous’(pp.193–4).

Now,inthisbroadened,transcendentalizedsense,theversionofMDRthat

LafontwantstoattributetoHeideggerisaverystrongclaim.AsLafontnotes,

ifHeideggerweresimplyadvancingtheweakerhypothesisthatwheneverwe

experienceanything,‘wehavealwaysalreadyunderstoodentitiesinoneway

220 MarkA.Wrathall

orother’,hisclaimwouldbeunobjectionable.Butsheseeshimasadvancing

themuchstrongerthesisthat‘thewayinwhichweinfacthavealwaysalready

understoodeverythingisconstitutiveofwhatthingsareorofwhatthingswe

canreferto’(p.139,n31).Infact,Ithinksomethingverymuchlikethis

weakerhypothesisisHeidegger’sactualposition.Noonewoulddenythat

Heideggerbelievesourexperienceofthingsis guided byameaningfully

structuredunderstandingoftheworld.AsIreadHeidegger,however,itisnot

possibletogetfromthisuncontroversialclaimtothestrong,transcendental

versionofMDR,becauseourunderstandingoftheworldisprimarilyan

existentialratherthanalinguisticgraspofit.Weare‘alwaysalready

immediatelydwellingamongthings’,Heideggerwrites,sothatforus‘thereis

nooutside,forwhichreasonitisalsoabsurdtotalkaboutaninside’. 3 Bythis,

hemeansthatourintentionalstates(includingbeliefs,perceptions,andsuch)

necessarilyhavetheircontent Ž xedbythebeingswithwhichweareengaged

inbeingintheworld.Consequently,IseeHeideggerasanearlyadvocateof

thedecidedlyanti-MDRviewthatsomethingmorethansubjectivelygrasped

meaningsisdeterminativeofourexperienceoftheworld.

ButIcan’targueinanydetailforthisinterpretationofHeideggerhere.

Instead,Iwanttoask,whatwouldittakeforLafonttojustifyattributingthe

strongerclaimtoHeidegger?Fromwhatwe’veseensofaraboutMDR,we

canconcludethatanecessaryconditionforshowingthatHeideggerdoes

acceptMDRinthestrong,transcendentalsense,isshowingthatforhimthe

meaningsintermsofwhichweunderstandthingsaresubjectiveand

internalist,i.e.thattheircontentcanbegraspedindependentlyofany

knowledgeaboutobjectsoreventsintheworld.Bythesametoken,if

Heidegger,likePutnam,believesthatthethingsthemselvesareatleastco-

constitutiveofourunderstandingofmeanings,thenwewouldhave

compellinggroundstodenythataninternalistmeaningdetermineswhat

wecanreferto.TosaddleHeideggerwithMDR,itwouldalsobenecessaryto

showthathethinkswecanonlyexperiencethingsinthetermsofourprior,

internalistunderstanding.So,ifthereisevidencethatHeideggerbelievesthat

ourexperienceofthingsissometimesnotlinguisticallyarticulated,thenthere

isgoodevidencetoconcludethatthestrongerclaimisnotfairlyattributable

tohim.Finally,weshouldnotethatbecausethequestioniswhether

attributionoftheweakerorthestrongerclaimtoHeideggeriscorrect,it

obviouslydoesnotsupportLafontto Ž ndhimsayingthingsconsistentwith

theweakerclaim–thingslike,‘theunderstandingofbeing...liesatthe

basisofallcomportmenttobeingsandguidesit’. 4

Lafontmakesanumberofargumentstosupportattributingthestronger

claimtoHeidegger,andIcouldn’tpossiblytacklemorethanacoupleof

them.SoI’vechosentoconsiderherargumentsthatbearmostcloselyona

subjectofparticularinteresttome–theearlyHeidegger’sviewsoftruth.Of

course,sinceherinterpretationisbasedinareadingofHeidegger’stextsasa

Heidegger,Truth,andReference 221

whole,whatIsayherewillhardlyconstituteadecisiverefutationofher

approach.ButIhopeatleasttoprovidesomeevidencethatanotherreadingis

possible–onethatavoidstheabsurdconsequencesLafontfearsand,I

believe,ismoreconsistentwithHeidegger’stexts.

II.Lafont’sEvidence

InwhatfollowsIexaminesomeofLafont’sarguments.I Ž rstdiscusstwoof

thepassagesfromHeideggerthatLafontbelievesprovidedirectevidence

forattributingMDRtohim:Heidegger’sdiscussionofessences,andthe

ideathat‘thatwhichstandsinviewinadvance,andthewayinwhichitthus

stands,decideswhatweinfactseeineachparticularcase’; 5 and

Heidegger’srepeatedinsistencein BeingandTime thatentitiescanonly

beuncoveredonthebasisofa‘priorprojectionoftheirconstitutionofbeing

[ Seinsverfassung ]’,orthesimilarclaimthat‘onlyiftheunderstandingof

Beingis,doentitiesasentitiesbecomeaccessible’. 6 Inadditiontosuch

directevidence,LafontfrequentlyarguesthatsomepositionofHeidegger’s

isonlytenableonthebasisofMDR.Iconcludebylookingatonesuch

indirectargument.

Iturn,then,toLafont’sreadingofHeidegger’sviewofessences,andthe

waytheyconstrainanddeterminewhatweexperience.Shewrites:

Totheextentthatthisknowledgeofessenceallowsinadvanceforadistinctionbetween

meaningfulandmeaninglesspropositions,andtherebyseparatesthesayablefromthe

unsayable,itmakesuptheconditionofpossibilityoftheknowledgeoffacts.Withrespectto

thislatterkindofknowledge,theknowledgeofessencehasanaprioristatus,sinceitis

constitutiveforouraccesstointraworldlyentitiesassuch.Thisisthecaseinsofarasthe

knowledgeofessenceiswhat Ž rstdisclosesthebeingofentities,withoutwhichtheycouldnot

appear,andonwhichbasisalonemeaningfulascertainmentsoffactcanbemade.Inthissense,

‘theknowledgeofessenceguidesandsurpassesallexperienceandallcomportmenttoward

entities’( GA 45,p.76).Butatthesametime, as suchaknowledgeofessence,itisalso

responsibleforthe identi Ž cation ofanyindividualentity.Heideggerunderscoresthisinhis WS

1937/38Freiburglecturecourse:‘Everinaccordancewithhowwegather[ erblicken ]essence

andtowhatextentwedoso,wearealsoabletoexperienceandtodeterminewhatisparticular

aboutthings.Thatwhichstandsinviewinadvance,andhowitthusstands, decides whatwe in

fact seeineachparticularcase’.( GA 45,p.65;[Lafont’sitalics])(p.194)

Weshould,ofcourse,observethatthe Ž rstpassageLafontquotesis

evidenceonlyfortheweakerclaim.Andthereisarealquestionwhetherthe

secondpassageshequotesisfairlyattributabletoHeideggerhimself.Inthe

sentenceimmediatelyprecedingthequotedsentence,Heideggerexplains

thatheisdiscussingtheplatonicnotionofessence.Intheparagraph

immediatelyprecedingthepassage,Heideggerdescribestheplatonic

notionofessenceas‘perhapsthemostconsequential,in � uential,and

disastrousphilosophicalde Ž nitioninWesternthinking’. 7 Afullerandmore

charitablereadingofthislecturecoursewouldseethatHeideggeristrying

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